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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST LAW-Exemption of Labor Union Activity under
the Sherman Act-UMIV v. Pennington; Local 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. (Sup. Ct. 1965).
On June 7,1965, the United States Supreme Court handed down
the companion cases, UFW v. Pennington,' and Local 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea C0. 2 Pennington held that
a union forfeits its antitrust exemption when it agrees with one
group of employers to impose a particular wage scale on other
employers in order to force them out of business. Jewel Tea
held that the imposition on an individual employer of the terms
of an agreement between the union and a multi-employer bar-
gaining unit is exempt from the Sherman Act 3 if the terms im-
posed are of legitimate bargaining concern to the union. U(MW
v. Pennington, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585 (1965). (6 (3 concurring) -to-
3). Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 85
Sup. Ct. 1596 (1965). (6 (3 concurring) -to-3).
Two declared congressional policies are involved; first, an anti-
trust policy which seeks to preserve a competitive business econ-
omy, and second, a national labor policy which seeks to protect
the rights of labor to organize in order to better its conditions
through collective bargaining.4 These two cases represent the
Court's latest attempt to reconcile these concepts.
"The purpose and effect of every labor organization is to
eliminate competition in the labor market."5 Every union seeks
to control the price and supply of available labor and, in that
sense, is an avowed monopolist.6 Further, both management and
labor have a mutual interest in limiting competition in the
market for the goods which they produce :7 management, direct-
ly, for the purpose of increasing profits, and labor, indirectly,
since management's more favorable financial condition enhances
the prospect of obtaining bargaining concessions. "The relation-
1. 85 Sup. Ct. 1585 (1965).
2. 85 Sup. Ct. 1596 (1965).
3. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
4. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
806 (1945).
5. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 252, 254 (1955).
6. Organized labor's control of the labor market is, however, not affected
by the Sherman Act's section two prohibition against the exercise of monopoly
power. See Cox, supra note 5, at 253-54.
7. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YA.LE L.J. 14, 17 (1963).
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ship of collective bargaining to product competition, therefore,
is an issue of great contemporary relevance."8
Organized labor's activities in the labor market and the result-
ing restraint on commercial enterprise seemingly conflict with
the Sherman Act's section one prohibition against "every" com-
bination in restraint of trade or commerce.0 The Sherman Act,
however, must be read as a "harmonizing text"'1° with the Clay-
ton Act," the National Labor Relations Act,12 and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.13 Each is expressive of congressional intent
which is the determining factor in the reconciliation of labor
and antitrust policy. The Clayton Act declares that "the labor
of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce"
and that the existence or operation of a labor organization, as
such, is not an illegal combination in restraint of trade."4 The
National Labor Relations Act indicates congressional intent to
protect the employee's power to negotiate wages, hours and con-
ditions of employment.r The Norris-LaGuardia Act establishes
that the allowable area of union activity in the labor market
is not restricted to the immediate employee-employer relation."8
It appears, therefore, and has been recognized by the Supreme
Court,17 that a labor union's activities in the labor market are
"exempt" from the prohibitions of section one of the Sherman
Act.18 The question is then resolved to a determination of wheth-
8. Id. at 16.
9. Section one of the Sherman Act provides that "every combination
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal."
Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1958).
10. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
11. Clayton Antitrust Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
12. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
13. Norris-LaGuardia Act, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
14. Clayton Antitrust Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958).
15. See Cox, supra note 5, at 254.
16. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). Norris-La-
Guardia was passed at least partially in response to the Court's holding in
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1920) that a secondary
boycott was not within the Clayton Act's "exemption" to the Sherman Act.
17. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 502 (1940).
18. The union's monopoly power-the control of job opportunities-primarily
affects labor-management relations or internal union affairs. This has little to
do with the purpose of the antitrust laws-the prevention of restraints in com-
petition in business.
We may take it as a premise that the antitrust laws are not concerned
with competition among laborers or with bargains over the price or
supply of labor-its compensation or hours of service or the selection
and tenure of employees.
Cox, supra note 5, at 255.
[Vol. 17
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er this "exemption" extends to union activity in the product
market (limiting production, fixing prices, etc.) and, if so, to
what extent.
The 1940 case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 9 represents the
Court's first attempt to formulate the governing principles of
labor-antitrust litigation.20 Interpreting the Sherman Act in
its historical context,21 the Court determined that it was not
aimed at policing interstate commerce, as such,22 but at prohibit-
ing restraints on "commercial competition in the marketing of
goods and. services."23 Moreover, such restraints do not violate
the Sherman Act "unless the restraint is shown to have or is
intended to have an effect upon prices in the market or other-
wise to deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which
they derive from free competition." 24 Labor union activity in
the labor market is "exempt" from the Sherman Act because it
is not the type activity contemplated by the act and, therefore,
not that which the act was designed to prevent.
In 1941 United States v. Hutheson25 held that "so long as a
union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups,"20 it is not subject to the interdictions of the
Sherman Act. In 1946 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Intl Bhd. of
Elec. Workers2 7 found no congressional intent to allow unions
to assist business in violating the Sherman Act 28 and held that
unions could not "aid non-labor groups to create business mono-
polies and to control marketing of goods and services.129 Hutche-
son is, primarily, expositive of national labor policy. Self serv-
ing activity not in combination with non-labor groups is the
19. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
20. See Winter, supra note 7, at 39. For an historical analysis of pre-1940
judicial reaction to the Sherman and Clayton acts, see Cox, supra note 5;
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.
Ci. L. REv. 659 (1965) ; Winter, supra note 7.
21. The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in
business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of pur-
chasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be
regarded as a special form of public injury.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
22. Id. at 490.
23. Id. at 495.
24. Id. at 500-01.
25. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
26. United States v. Hutcheson, 213 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
27. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
28. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
810 (1945).
29. Id. at 808.
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type activity contemplated in collective bargaining. Congress's
avowed purpose to foster such activity under the National Labor
Relations Act indicates their lack of intent to condemn it under
the Sherman Act. 0 Allen Bradley, on the other hand, is primar-
ily definitive of antitrust policy: business should not be allowed
to do by indirection what it admittedly could not do directly.
In so far as there may have been a conflict, however, Allen Brad-
ley, as well as Hutcheson, was an attempt by the Court to de-
termine how far Congress intended activities under the National
Labor Relations Act to neutralize the results envisioned by the
Sherman Act."'
Due to the divided nature of the Court,8 2 Pennington holds no
more than did Allen-Bradley: that a union loses its exemption
from the antitrust laws when it combines with a non-labor group
for the purpose of eliminating competition."3 The opinion of
the Court, however, written by Mr. Justice White and concurred
in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, would not
have limited the denial of the antitrust exemption to those cases
involving a predatory intent. In their view, regardless of pur-
pose, a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws
when it agrees with one set of employers to impose a specified
wage scale or other terms on other employer bargaining units.
This type agreement is contrary to the spirit of both labor and
antitrust policy. The union's obligation to its members is best
served when it retains the ability to respond to each bargaining
situation without being strait-jacketed by prior agreements. "On
the other hand, the policy of antitrust laws is clearly set against
employer-union agreements seeking to prescribe labor standards
outside the bargaining unit.13 4 The agreement, clearly in con-
flict with antitrust policy and lacking protection from national
30. The author concedes the anachronistic fallacy of this argument.
31. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
806 (1945).
32. Only the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in Mr. Justice
White's "majority" opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by justices Black and
Clark, concurred in Pennington and dissented in Jewel Tea, adhering to the
predatory purpose precepts of Allen Bradley. Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by
Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented in Pennington and concurred in Jewel
Tea,. maintaining that no union activity concerning mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining under the National Labor Relations Act was subject to the antitrust
laws.
33. See Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust
Laws, 32 U. CHr. L. REv. 659, 714-34 (1965) ("Epilogue" on the Pennington
and Jewel Tea cases).
34. UMW v. Pennington, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1965).
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labor policy, is sheltered by no congressional intent to exempt it
from the Sherman Act.
A similar division of the Court in JeweZ Tea leaves the im-
plications of this decision also in doubt.35 In that case the butch-
ers union had obtained an agreement from a multi-employer
bargaining unit whereby the employers agreed not to sell meat
before nine a.m. or after six pm. This restriction would have had
a direct affect on the product market in that it would have pre-
cluded convenience of shopping hours as a means of competition.
The question, therefore, was whether the union's attempt to im-
pose this restriction on an individual employer, pursuant to the
union's own self interests, fell within the protection of national
labor policy and was therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.
Mr. Justice White was of the opinion that in this particular
factual context the union had a legitimate and vital self interest
in the imposition of the marketing hours restriction which would
mitigate the resultant restraint on the product market. The
implication of his opinion, however, is that existence of such
mitigating interest on the part of the union is a question of fact,
and that the lack of such interest will negate the union's anti-
trust exemption although it acts "in pursuit of its own labor
union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with
non labor groups."3 6 "The crucial determinant is not the form
of the agreement-e.g., price or wages-but its relative impact
on the product market and the interests of union members."
37
In these respects, the Court's opinion in Pennington and Jewel
Tea, should it later commend itself to a majority of the Court,
represents an extension of the apparent holding of Hutcheson
and AZlen Bradley. In either event, however, the cases serve to
define the applicable standards in labor-antitrust litigation:
that union-imposed restraints on "commercial competition in
the marketing of goods and services"3 18 are exempt from the
35. Thus the issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours restriction,
like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and
working conditions that the unions' successful attempt to obtain that pro-
vision through bona fide, arms-length bargaining in pursuit of its own
labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with non-
labor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor policy and
is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.
Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 1596, 1602
(1965). See note 32 supra.
36. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 85 Sup. Ct.
1596, 1602 (1965).
37. Id. at 1602 n.5.
38. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
1965]
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Sherman Act only when those restraints are justified by the
legitimate interests of union members, as defined by the applica-
tion of national labor policy as expressed by the National Labor
Relations Act.8 9 The application of this standard to specific fact-
ual situations is, at present, obscured by the divided nature of
the Court.
MAtTjA L. GAimsow
39. The apparent determining factor in Jewel Tea was whether the market-
ing-hours restriction was within the realm of "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment" in the mandatory bargaining provision of § 8(d)
of the National Labor Relations Act.
Unquestionably the Board's demarcation of the bounds of the duty to
bargain has great relevance to any consideration of the sweep of labor's
antitrust immunity, for we are concerned here with harmonizing the
Sherman Act with the national policy expressed in the National Labor
Relations Act of promoting 'the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes
by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence
of negotiation.'
UMW v. Pennington, 85 Sup. Ct. 1585, 1590 (1965). See separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Goldberg, 85 Sup. Ct. at 1607 (1965).
[Vol. 17
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BANKRUPTCY-Priority of Creditors in Chapter XI Proceed-
ing-Government agency will not have priority where it is an
unsecured creditor-United States v. NationaZ Furniture Co.
(8th Cir. 1965).
In February, 1965, a receiver was appointed for National
Furniture Co. which had filed for an "arrangement" under Chap-
ter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.' Thereafter the referee found
that a majority of National's unsecured creditors had filed claims
and voted unanimously in favor of National's petition for ar-
rangement of the debts. The Small Business Administration
(SBA) objected to the proposed arrangement, and demanded
that the sum owed it be set aside as priority costs. The referee
and the United States District Court for the Western District
of Arkansas granted judgment for the defendant.2 On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held
reversed.3 The United States, on behalf of the SBA as a par-
tially unsecured creditor, is not entitled to a priority claim in a
Chapter XI bankruptcy proceeding. United States v. National
Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1965). (3-to-0).
The purpose of a Chapter XI proceeding is to provide, with-
out resort to general bankruptcy, an efficient and orderly method
of satisfying the claims of unsecured or common creditors of a
debtor.4 The debtor is considered any person5 who might be-
come a bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, and includes any
corporation, except a municipality, a railroad, an insurance or
banking corporation or a building and loan association." To
initiate a Chapter XI proceeding, the debtor must file a volun-
1. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1958).
2. The referee determined that National had assets totaling $38,650.00 against
liabilities amounting to $52,932.94 and that the SBA held a lien on National's
equipment, machinery and furnishings worth $2,500.00 in addition to personal
guaranties. He concluded that the SBA was therefore a secured creditor for
the $18,810.39 owed it by National and was prevented from participating in
Chapter XI "arrangement" proceedings. The district court adopted the referee's
findings-of fact and conclusions of law in toto. In re Nat'l Furniture Co., 230
F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
3. In establishing that the SBA was a partially unsecured creditor, the
court said that a creditor is not secured under the bankruptcy laws unless he
has security which consists of property of the bankrupt. In re United Cigar
Stores Co. of America, 73 F.2d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1934). To the extent that
the debt exceeded the security, the creditor is an unsecured creditor. In re
Everick Art Corp., 39 F.2d 765, 768 (2d Cir. 1930).
4. In re National Furniture Co., 230 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
5. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(23) (Supp. 1964).
6. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 22 (Supp. 1964) ; SEC v. United States
Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
1965]
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tary petition for arrangement in such a court as would have
jurisdiction of a petition in general bankruptcy. In addition,
he must file the proposed arrangement, which is defined as "any
plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of
the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms."7
As pointed out in SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co.,8 a Chap-
ter XI proceeding is in the hands of the debtor, subject only to
the requisite consent of a majority (in number and amount) of
unsecured creditors.
As a rule, in general bankruptcy the claims of the United
States are given priority.9 This is evidenced by the general
priority statute which states that the debts owed the United
States by a person who is insolvent shall be first satisfied.10
This priority extends not only to situations where an act of
bankruptcy is committed but also to situations where the debtor,
having insufficient property to pay his debts, makes a voluntary
assignment." It seems that the priority statute in conjunction
with provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 12 would establish prior-
ity for the government. The debtor, however, must be insolvent
and must make a voluntary assignment or commit an act of
bankruptcy.
The general bankruptcy cases' 3 deal only with equity re-
ceivership proceedings in which the trustee or receiver adminis-
ters all of the property of the insolvent debtor in liquidation of
its assets for the benefit of creditors. 14 This distinguishes them
from National because a Chapter XI proceeding permits the
debtor to remain in possession of his property and operate his
business under court supervision. The court may, when neces-
7. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 706 (1958).
8. 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
9. SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960).
10. Money and Finance (Priority Statute), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
11. Ibid.
12. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp. 1964) provides: "(a) The debts to have
priority, in advance of the payments of dividends to creditors ... shall be (5)
debts owing to any person, including the United States, who by the laws of
the United States in [sic] entitled to priority. . ."
13. In these cases it was held that the surrendering of assets for liquidation,
or the acquiescence in the appointment of a receiver, where the debtor is in-
solvent or unable to meet maturing obligations, is sufficient to constitute an
act of bankruptcy. See e.g., Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362
(1946) ; Nev York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933) ; United States v. Butter-
worth-Judson Corp., 269 U.S. 504 (1926); Bramwell v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483 (1926).
14. United States v. National Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1965).
[Vol  17
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1964], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/10
RECENT DEcisioNs
sary, appoint a receiver of the debtor's property,' 5 but the re-
ceiver's duty is not to liquidate assets but to act in a supervisory
capacity. He is primarily a distributing agent and will function
most actively in the distribution of stipulated amounts paid into
the court by the debtor for the satisfaction of creditors' claims. 16
Accordingly, United States v. Sohroeder7 held that mere ap-
pointment of a receiver does not serve to constitute an act of
bankruptcy. In this case the receiver was appointed in a Chapter
XI proceeding for the enforcement of tax liens. In the absence
of the requisite act of bankruptcy, the priority provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code were not available to the government.
Since the transactions of National were not tantamount to acts
of bankruptcy' 8 within the meaning of the priority statute, it is
evident that the SBA did not qualify as a priority creditor. With-
out this qualification the government, as an unsecured creditor,
can participate in a Chapter XI proceeding only on a parity
with other unsecured creditors.' 9 A holding to the contrary,
seemingly, would serve only as a guide to defeat the purpose for
which Chapter XI was designed.
WS= L. BRowN
15. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1958).
16. United States v. National Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1965).
17. 204 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Iowa 1962) ; see I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 3.502
(14th ed. Supp. 1964).
18. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 21 (Supp. 1964), provides: "(a) Acts of
bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having . . . (5) while insolvent or
unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered volun-
tarily, or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge
of his property."
19. United States v. National Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390, 394 (8th Cir. 1965).
1965]
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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS-Forged Indorsement-Stat-
ute of limitations commences when the drawer receives his can-
celled checks and bank statement-Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank v.
State Budget & Control Bd. (S.C. 1965).
Will Morris retired from the employment of the State of South
Carolina in 1947 and began receiving monthly benefit checks.
These checks were drawn on the Citizens & Southern National
Bank, the original defendant. In 1949 Morris died, but the State
Budget & Control Board continued to issue the checks until
1963 when his death was discovered. A member of Morris' family
had been forging his signature on the checks and cashing them.
The checks were then charged to the Board's account and for-
warded to it with monthly statements showing the charges
against the account. When the forgeries were discovered, the
Board demanded reimbursement. This was refused and a declar-
atory judgment was sought to determine the liability of the
parties for the checks (a total of 5,392.73 dollars). The bank
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to all checks
issued prior to 1957 on the ground that any claim for recovery
was barred by the six year statute of limitations. The trial
court granted this motion.1 On appeal to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, held, affirmed.
The statute of limitations begins to run when the drawer re-
ceives the cancelled checks bearing the forged indorsements
accompanied by a statement showing that these checks have been
charged to his account. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank v. State Budget
& Control Bd., 142 S.E. 874 (S.C. 1965). (5-to-O).
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act contains no relevant
statute of limitation provision, and when South Carolina en-
acted this law, no specific provision was added.2 Thus, when
Citizens & So. arose, the court was faced with the problem of
1. Record, pp. 1-10, Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank v. State Budget & Control
Bd., 142 S.E.2d 874 (S.C. 1965).
2. On the subject of forged checks South Carolina's Negotiable Instruments
Law merely states:
When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person
whose signature it purports to be it is wholly inoperative, and no right to
retain the instrument, to give a discharge thereof against any party there-
to can be acquired through or under such signature unless the party
against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting
up the forgery or want of authority.
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 8-834 (1962). Since there is no mention of a limitation re-
quirement, it is necessary to refer to the general code provisions. When the
subject matter of the cause of action is a check, the action lies in contract, and
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supplementing the state's code. While the court did not state
the reasons for its decision, it reflects the prior holdings of five
other jurisdictions where this same situation occurred.,
All of these courts have recognized the general rule that the
depositor's cause of action does not accrue until the depositor
has made a demand on the bank for his money and the bank
has refused to comply with this demand. Until the cause of
action accrues, the statute of limitations will not be set in motion.
This rule stems from the fact that a bank account is a debt owed
by the bank to the depositor, payable on demand. Until the de-
mand is made and refused, the depositor has no claim against
the bank. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this
rule where the court finds that demand and refusal are unneces-
sary. Thus, the courts have reasoned that when the drawer re-
ceives his cancelled checks and a statement showing that these
checks have been deducted from his account, he is put on notice
that the bank denies any personal liability on these checks. A
formal demand and a formal refusal are unnecessary to perfect
the cause of action and to begin the statute of limitations, be-
cause the bank statement indicates that the bank will resist any
claim by the drawer in excess of the balance shown on the
statement.4
At first glance this seems to be an unnecessarily harsh rule
for the drawer, because it would be possible for the statute to
bar recovery before the drawer learns of the forgery. It is
necessary, however, for the protection of the bank. In addition,
under settled principles of law, knowledge has never effected the
commencement of any statute of limitation unless a fraud has
3. The states and cases are:
California-Union Tool Co. v. Fanner's Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac.
424 (1923) ; Glassell Dev. Co. v. Citizens Nat!1 Bank, 191 Cal. 375, 216 Pac.
1012 (1923).
Kansas-Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. Fourth Nat'1 Bank, 135 Kan. 414,
10 P.2d 896 (1932).
Mississippi-Masonic Benefit Ass'n v. First State Bank, 99 Miss. 610, 50 So.
408 (1911).
Washington-Bruce v. First Nat'l Bank, 180 Wash. 614, 41 P.2d 779 (1935).
Wisconsin-Peppas v. Marshall & Ulsley Bank, 2 Wis. 2d 144, 86 N.W.2d 27
(1957).
Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 214 Minn. 370,
8 N.W.2d 333 (1943) ; Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co., 204 N.Y. 200, 97 N.E.
517 (1912); In re Penn Bank, 152 Pa. 65, 25 Atl. 310 (1892). The case of
Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 95 Cal. App. 338, 272 Pac. 799 (Cal. App.
1928) raised some doubt as to the strength of California's position. However,
their subsequent enactment of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE clarified the
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been perpetrated on the injured party.5 Even where the entire
damage is not discovered or does not occur until recovery is
barred, the statute has not been extended.8
Florida, alone, has reached a contrary decision. Under a doc-
trine of "blameless ignorance," the Florida Supreme Court held
that the statute did not begin to run until the drawer discovered
the forged indorsement.7 It was felt that this decision was
fairer to the drawer. Further, it placed no new limitations on
the bank because the bank had the opportunity and the responsi-
bility of determining the genuineness of an indorsement and the
identity of the person presenting the check for payment. The
drawer, on the other hand, has neither the facilities nor the
knowledge necessary to determine whether the payee's signature
is genuine or forged.8
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been enacted in
forty three jurisdictions, is essentially in accord with South
Carolina and the states, other than Florida, which have passed
on this problem. The pertinent section of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code states that "without regard to care or lack of care
of either the customer or the bank,"9 the customer must discover
and report any forged indorsement within three years from the
time that the statement and cancelled checks are made available
to him. 10
This rule, as reflected in the Commercial Code and the Citi-
zens & So. decision, appears to be supported by the better rea-
soning and logic. The main reason cancelled checks and state-
ments are sent to a depositor is to call his attention to the trans-
actions, so that he may determine if there are any errors. To hold
5. Peppas v. Marshall & lisley Bank, 2 Wis. 2d 144, 86 N.W2d 27 (1957) ;
Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, 35 Ga. App. 315, 132 S.E. 914 (1926) ; Wright v.
Hamilton, 2 Bailey 51 (S.C. 1830); see 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 145
n.38 (1955). See 5BMicmiaE, BANKS AND BANING § 357a (1931).
6. Walter J. Klein Co. v. Kneece 239 S.C. 478, 123 S.E.2d 870 (1962);
Livingston v. Sims, 197 S.C. 458, 15 S.E.2d 770 (1941); Thomas v. Ervin,
Cheves 22 (S.C. 1839). Accord, Van Ingen v. Duffin, 158 Ala. 318, 48 So.
507 (1909) ; American Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 131 Ga. 853, 63
S.E. 622 (1909); Ott v. Hood, 152 Wis. 97, 139 N.W. 762 (1913). See S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-143(7), 57-301 (1962). See generally 34 Amr. JuR. Limitation
of Actions § 230 n.17 (1938).
7. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Edgerly, 121 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1960).
8. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Edgerly, supra note 7. This doctrine
of "blameless ignorance" is not new in Florida. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Ford, 92 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla.
1954) ; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Tharpe, 131 Fla. 213, 179 So. 406 (1938).
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406(4).
10. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-406(4), 1-201(43).
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that a drawer's cause of action commences at this point is in
keeping with this purpose. Further, the statute of limitations is
intended to end the threat of litigation after a specified time.
If the statute did not begin to run until the drawer discovered
the forgery, the bank would be exposed to the possibility of a
suit for an indeterminable period of time. This would mean that
the bank could never close its books on any account. After any
considerable time lapse, the difficulty of proof for both sides
would be greatly increased. 1
MARY Jo SoTT E
11. While South Carolina's six year statute would bar the drawer's action
against the bank, it would also in its normal application bar the legitimate
payee's action against the drawer. Thus, it is not likely that the drawer would
have to pay twice on the same obligation. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 8-9,
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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS-Unconscionable Contract for
the Sale of Goods-Action by seller to repossess furniture denied
where contract for the sale is unconscionable--William v. Walk-
er-Thomas Furniture Co. (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Mrs. Williams, the original defendant, purchased a stereo set
costing over 500 dollars from the Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company. According to the terms of the contract which, Mrs.
Williams admitted, she had not read, the stereo set was leased to
her for a monthly rental and title passed when her payments
equalled the retail price. Other provisions1 of the contract, how-
ever, stated that she would not acquire title to any items until
her payments totalled the composite value of all items ever pur-
chased. When she bought the stereo she was on relief and was
receiving 218 dollars monthly. With this income, she was sup-
porting seven children plus herself. The name of her social
worker and the amount she received were listed on the reverse
side of the contract.
After a default in her payments, the furniture company sought
to repossess all items she had purchased for the previous five
years. The lower court said that it found no grounds upon which
it could declare the contract unenforceable as against public
policy and ruled in favor of the furniture company. On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, held, reversed and remanded with instructions. The
terms of the contract, on common law principles, may be uncon-
scionable and enforcement violative of public policy. The lower
court should make a factual determination in light of this possi-
bility. Villiams v. Valker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965). (2-to-i).
The general doctrine of freedom of contract gives the parties
to an agreement considerable liberty in setting the obligations
which arise from their bargaining.2 This liberty is, however,
1. The contract further provided that 'the amount of each periodical install-
ment payment to be made by (purchaser) to the Company ... shall be
inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each installment payment
to be made by (purchaser) under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and
all payments now and hereafter made by (purchaser) shall be credited
pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company
by (purchaser) at the time such payment is made.'
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2. "Courts keep in mind the principle that the best interests of society de-
mand that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to
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by no means absolute.3 Whenever a court finds that a contract is
tainted by fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or undue influence,
the contract will not be enforced. It is possible, however, for a
contract to be free from any of these defects, yet still be so un-
fair and unreasonable that enforcement of its terms would be
inequitable. It is in this area, beyond fraud 4 that the uncon-
scionability of the contract may be presented to a court5 and
relief afforded to a party who would otherwise be without a
remedy.6
Walker-Thomas Furniture held that, based on common law
principles, if the terms of a contract are unreasonably favorable
to one party and it appears that the other party entered into
the contract without the benefit of any meaningful choice as to
its terms, a court can deny enforcement on this ground of un-
conscionability.7
In determining the reasonableness of a contract,8 a court must
view its terms in light of the circumstances that existed when the
3. E.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949); Blum v.
Engleman, 190 Md. 109, 57 A2d 201 (1940); David Longran Co. v. Lord
Baltimore Candy and Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 201 (1940).
4. The lower court found that Mrs. Williams assent was not obtained by
fraud or even misrepresentation which fell short of fraud. Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964).
5. "It has been suggested that an unconscionable contract is one 'such as no
man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and
as no honest or fair man would accept on the other'." Mandel v. Libeman, 303
N.Y. 88, 94, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1951).
6. After this contract had been entered into, Congress enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code for the District of Columbia, 28 D.C. CODE §§ 1-101 to 10-104
(Supp. IV 1965). Had the Code been controlling in this action (the Code be-
came effective in the District of Columbia on January 1, 1965), its section on
unconscionable contracts for the sale of goods, set out below, would have
disposed of the case:
(1). If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable results.
(2). When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, pur-
pose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
28 D.C. CODE § 2-302 (Supp. IV 1965).
7. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
8. One test which has been suggested is for the court to decide whether or
not the contract is so extreme as to be unconscionable according to the mores
and business practices of the time and place. Mandel v. Libeman, 303 N.Y. 88,
100 N.E2d 149 (1951). See 1 CoPBiN, CONTRACTs § 128 (1963).
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parties entered into the contract.9 Once it appears that the
terms are unreasonable, a court is faced with a determination
of whether a party had any meaningful choice in entering into
his agreement to be bound by those terms. 0 The fact that a
person is poor or of limited financial resources will not, in and of
itself, preclude a meaningful choice. In view of the circum-
stances of a particular case, however, there may be such a gross
inequality of bargaining power that meaningful choice will be
deemed absent." Also, a party's education is not normally cru-
cial in the decision of whether to enforce a contract, but his
obvious education or lack of it is to be considered in determining
whether he had an opportunity to understand the terms of a
contract.' 2
The question of whether a contract is unconscionable, just
as the determination of the reasonableness of the terms of the
contract, must be answered after viewing all the circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract. The doctrine of un-
conscionability may not, therefore, be invoked by a party who
has experienced a set-back because conditions have changed since
the date of the contract.'3
9.... the fairness or hardship of a contract is to be determined as of the
time when it is made, not on the basis of subsequent changes in conditions
which may make it less beneficial to one party and more beneficial to the
other than at the time when it was entered into.
Pollin v. Perkin, 223 Md. 532, -, 165 A.2d 908, 913 (1960).
10. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
11. In Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), the court stated
that one reason for not enforcing contracts which released tug-boat owners and
operators from all liability for injuries caused by their negligence was to pro-
tect those in need of goods and services from being overreached by others who
have power to drive hard bargains.
12. See Continental Jewelry Co. v. Kerhulas, 136 S.C. 496, 134 S.E. 505
(1926). There the court granted a new trial to Kerhulas, a Greek who could
read and write very little English, and who signed a contract without reading
it or having it read to him. The court ordered that he be allowed to introduce
evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation of the seller's agent, upon which he
relied in signing the contract. See also J. B. Colt Co. v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226,
236, 123 S.E. 845, 849 (1924), where the court stated:
We are not here concerned with a person who is illiterate,... or unable
intelligently to construe and interpret the technical terms of a writing,..
or . . . to fully safeguard his interest by reading the paper.
See also Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 182, 14 S.E.2d 886, 887
(1941), where the court stated that the drift is toward the just doctrine that a
wrongdoer cannot avoid liability by asking a court to condemn the credulity of
the ignorant and unwary.
13. See South Carolina Reporter's Comments, § 2-302, UNIFORM ComaRcrAL
CODE, 102 (1965); see also Comment, § 2-302, UNiFoRm CommERcrAL CoDE, 69
(1962).
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The general rule is that one has a duty to read the terms of a
contract before signing.14 Normally one who signs a contract
without full knowledge of its terms can be said to have assumed
the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.15 In addition,
a person failing to read a contract may be precluded from setting
up fraudulent misrepresentations of the other party. If the con-
duct of the defrauded party amounts to a negligent disregard
of the duty to read, which is imposed on him to protect his own
interests in the transaction, some decisions have held that such a
party may not avoid the contract even on the basis of actual
fraud.16 A party should be bound by his agreements, but when
"a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no
knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent ...
was ever given to all the terms."I When such conditions exist,
a court should, by applying the doctrine of unconscionability,
decline to enforce the contract.
The doctrine allows a court to go beyond fraud by substituting
misconduct of a lesser sort-that which results in unfair sur-
prise or oppression."' If a court modifies a contract by applying
this doctrine, it is only because that court determined the
element of free (meaningful) choice was absent. Mutual free
consent is not thereby destroyed.19 The doctrine (as codified in
section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code20 ) has been criti-
cized as limiting freedom of contract 2l, but it is desirable to
establish general limits to this freedom and then define with
frankness the standards which are to be imposed.
22
J. C. BLAxm-Y, Jn.
14. Baldwin v. Postal Telegraph Co., 78 S.C. 419, 422, 59 S.E. 67, 68 (1907).
15. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965). See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 70 (1932).
16. See J. B. Colt Co. v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845 (1924).
17. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
18. See Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 583 (1959).
19. 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U=NIOR.M ComaERaCAL
CODE §§ 1.16-1.1603 (1st ed. 1954).
20. See generally Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 843 (1960).
21. See 70 YALE LJ. 453 (1962).
22. See Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 583 (1959).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Juries-Oath required of grand and
petit jurors held unconstitutional-Schowgurow v. Maryland
(Md. 1965).
A Buddhist, convicted of murder by a Maryland trial court,
claimed that his federal constitutional rights had been violated
because the grand jury which indicted him and the petit jury
which tried and convicted him were selected on the basis of a
belief in the existence of God. Buddhism does not teach a belief
in the existence of a Supreme Being. He contended that Article
36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights1 which required a
demonstration of belief in God as a qualification for service as
a grand or petit juror was in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's decision and, held, Article 36 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights is unconstitutional. Showgurow v. Mary-
land, 213 A.2d 475 (Md. 1965). (6-to-1).
In Torcaso v. YVatkinS2 the Supreme Court reversed the Mary-
land Court of Appeals which had held in a unanimous decision3
that a requirement that a notary public declare a belief in the
existence of God was not discriminatory or invalid. In reversing
this decision the Supreme Court held that a state could not pass
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers. In Schowgurow the court said that if "a notary
public cannot constitutionally be required to demonstrate his be-
lief in God as a condition to taking office, it follows inevitably
that the requirement is invalid as to grand and petit jurors,
whose responsibilities to the public ... are far greater." 4
In matters dealing with the first amendment's protection of
religious freedom, the Supreme Court has emphasized the abso-
lute liberty to believe, or not to believe.5 In Toreaso the Court
held for the first time that non-belief lay within the protective
sphere of the first amendment. The Court in Zorach v. Olauson6
by declaring that "we are a religious people whose institutions
1. "... nor shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent
as a witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided, he believes
in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be
held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor
either in this world or in the world to come."
2. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
3. Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 438 (1960).
4. Schowgurow v. Maryland, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (Md. 1965).
5. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
6. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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presuppose a Supreme Being," had appeared to imply that the
first amendment was concerned exclusively with religion; how-
ever, irreligion has now been given special recognition. The
school prayer case,7 which followed Torcaso by banning the non-
sectarian prayer "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depend-
ence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers, and our country,"8 has manifested the degree to
which the Court will go to ensure the freedom of godless belief.
This trend of the Court has stimulated much speculation con-
cerning the expanse of the doctrine of separation of "God and
State." To what extent the interrelated elements of religion and
public affairs will be declared unconstitutional is a subject which
is befogged by the enigmatic exhortations of a divided Court.9
The Court has attempted to make a distinction between those
facets of religion which are imbedded in our national character
which do not clash with a protected right and those which do.10
In Zorach it was said that the first amendment does not in every
respect decree a separation of church and state.-" In Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp12 the following test was developed in
an effort to elucidate the issue of involvement between legisla-
tion and religious freedom:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the pur-
pose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed
by the Constitution; that is to say that to withstand the
stricture of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.13
Considering this test in his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan attempted to show that the following, among others, are to
be considered constitutional :14
7. Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
8. Id. at 422.
9. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Engle v. Vitale, supra at 444 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ; Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, supra at 308 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
10. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan,
I., concurring).
11. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
12. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
13. Abington School Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
14. Id. at 295-304.
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1. churches and chaplains at military establishments
2. legislative chaplains and invocations
3. "In God We Trust" inscriptions on currency
4. tax exemptions which benefit churches
5. draft exemptions for seminary students
6. the pledge of allegiance--"one nation, under God"
However, Mr. Justice Douglas in Engel v. Vitale'5 expressed his
belief that all such interrelationship should be held unconsti-
tutional. And Mr. Justice Stewart has pointed out the indis-
tinguishable similarity between those elements held to be con-
stitutional and those held to be forbidden within the principle
of the first amendment. He has noted especially the analogy
between the unconstitutional school prayer and the invocation
before each session of the Supreme Court itself, "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court."16
Although the exact extent to which Schowgurow, and the prin-
ciple upon which it is based, will be carried is not yet known,
it is obvious that South Carolina will feel certain immediate
effects. Jurors in South Carolina are not required to state a
belief in a Supreme Being; however, they must conclude their
oaths with the words, "So help me God."
1 7
Dealing with public officials, the state constitution says that
"no person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall
hold any office."' 8 A special provision provides that no person
who denies the existence of God shall be Governor of South
Carolina,19 and the South Carolina Code declares that "the
board of trustees [of the University of South Carolina] shall
take care that the president of the University shall not be an
atheist or infidel."20 These requirements fall within the for-
bidden sphere of unconstitutional state action as prohibited by
Toreaso and Schowgurow.
Another area of our law is vulnerable. If it is in violation of
the first amendment to require a juror to profess a belief in
15. 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
17. While there is no constitutional or legislative mandate requiring a par-
ticular oath, it is standard practice in South Carolina to conclude a juror's
oath in this manner. For an interesting comment on the Schowgurow decision
and its relation to South Carolina, see Faith of Our Fathers, The State, Nov.
7, 1965, (Editorial), p. 18.
18. S.C. CoNsT. art. 17, § 4.
19. S.C. CONsT. art. 4, § 3.
20. S.C. CODE ANxN. § 22-108 (1962).
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God, it naturally follows that to require a witness to affirm his
belief in God in order to testify is also unconstitutional.21 This
would deny an atheist the right to summon witnesses who con-
cur in his theological ideas. Many states do not require that a
witness profess a belief in a Supreme Being,22 but South Caro-
lina follows the common law rule and requires that a witness pro-
fess a belief in God.23 In State v. Beltort2 4 a twelve year old
boy who could repeat the Lord's prayer and had heard about
the bad man who caught those who lied, but had never heard
of a God or of Heaven was held incompetent to give testimony;
the conviction, therefore, was reversed.
The validity of our state laws has not been challenged since
Torcaso, but in light of the trend of the Supreme Court in
holding that an expression of faith in God is discriminatory and
in violation of the basic tenets of individual freedom,25 our legis-
lature and judiciary would be well-advised to consider changes
which by necessity must be made.
THomAs H. CuRLE, JR.
21. Murray v. Burns, 405 P.2d 309, 323 (Hawaii 1965) (dictum). See
Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 397, 190 A.2d 621, 625 (1963).
22. E.g., Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 245, 132 S.E.2d 648 (1963); Thomas v.
State, 73 Fla. 115, 74 So. 1 (1917); Anot., 95 A.L.R. 723 (1932).
23. State v. Abercrombie, 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142 (1925); Jones v.
Harris, 1 Strob. 160 (S.C. 1846).
24. 24 S.C. 185 (1886).
25. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDUIE-Exchange of Medical Reports
--Rule 35 (b) does not provide the exclusive method for exchange
of medical reports-Buffingtonv . Wood (3d Cir. 1965).
In 1960, the S.S. Pine Ridge broke in two off Cape Hatteras.
The owners and operators admitted liability, and suit was
brought to settle damages. At a pre-trial hearing an informal
agreement was made whereby the plaintiffs would voluntarily
submit to physical examinations by the defendant's doctors.
Over the plaintiff's objection, the court, in its pre-trial order,
directed that:
All medical reports shall be exchanged within five days of
the receipt thereof by either plaintiff's attorney or defend-
ant's attorney.1
This provision of the order was based on a local court rule pro-
viding for the court to order such an exchange. The plaintiffs
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for a writ of man-
damus, prohibition or both on the ground that the order violated
Federal Rule 35(b) (1).2 Held, petition denied. Rule 35(b)
makes available one method by which medical reports of a plain-
tiff's condition may be exchanged. This rule, however, was not
intended as the exclusive method for an exchange of medical
reports. Buffington v. Wood, - F.2d - (3d Cir. 1965). (3-
to-0).
Either the plaintiff or defendant, upon showing good cause,
may, under Rule 34,3 obtain a copy of his opponent's medical
reports when they are neither protected by a local privilege
Statute,4 nor come within the work product rule of Hickrnan v.
Taylor.5
Rather than Rule 34, however, Rule 35 is more appropriate
for the exchange of medical reports.6 Rule 35(a) 7 gives a party
a means through which, upon showing good cause, he can obtain
a court order directing his opponent to submit to a physical or
1. Buffington v. Wood, - F.2d -, - (3d Cir. 1965).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(1).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
4. Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1961).
5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see Currie v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 23
F.R.D. 660 (D. Mass. 1959). See generally Freeman, Production of State-
inents Under Discovery Proceedings In Federal Court, 17 S.C.L. REv. 529
(1965).
6. Galloway v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
7. Fan. R. Crv. P. 35(a).
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1964], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/10
5RECENT DECISIONS
mental examination when his opponent's condition is in issue.8
Rule 35(b) (1),9 allegedly violated in Buffington, provides that
a party who has been ordered to submit to a physical or mental
examination may demand a copy of the report of his examination.
A number of cases have held that the examined party is likewise
entitled to a copy of the report in an instance where he volun-
tarily submitted to the examination.10 There is no requirement
that the examined party show good cause. Moreover, where local
privilege statutes11 would prohibit discovery of the examined
party's reports even though good cause for their discovery has
been shown, Rule 35(b) (2)12 provides that the plaintiff waives
any privilege he may have with respect to his own medical re-
ports when he exercises his right to a copy of defendant's reports
of his condition.
13
This rule, therefore, provides a method by which the examined
party may, at his option, effect an exchange of medical reports.
The question presented by Buffington is whether such an ex-
change can be ordered by the court. It has been held that before
reports can be exchanged, the examined party must demand a
report of his examination by the defendant's doctors.14 If au-
thority is to be found for allowing a court to order such an ex-
change on its own accord, it must come from Rule 16 which gives
the judge the authority to conduct the pre-trial conference and
enter a pre-trial order.18 It is generally recognized that federal
discovery procedures are broad and are to be liberally inter-
preted,16 and it has been held that the Federal Rules relating to
8. 2A BAION AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 821
(Rules ed. 1961). See generally King, A Study of Rule 35 of The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 S.C.L.Q. 183 (1959).
9. FED. R. Crv. P. 35(b)(1).
10. E.g., Lipshitz v. Bleyhl, 5 F.R.D. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Rutherford v.
Alben, 1 F.R.D. 277 (S.D. W. Va. 1940).
11. Neither the common law, nor federal statutes afford privileged status to
medical reports. See, e.g., Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1961);
Holbert v. Chase, 12 F.R.D. 171 (E.D.S.C. 1952). Rule 35 will be strictly
construed when it is found to be in derogation of a local privilege statute.
Sher v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936
(1953).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2).
13. Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
14. E.g., Benning v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Sher v. DeHaven,
199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1953); Galloway
v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Holbert v.
Chase, 12 F.R.D. 171 (E.D.S.C. 1952). See generally Wright, Discovery § 88,
35 F.R.D. 39 (1963).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
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discovery are to be construed in pari materia.17 Rules 16 and
35 must therefore be harmonized to effectuate the underlying
policy of both.
The pre-trial order, if used effectively, can play a vital role
in achieving one of the major objectives of the Federal Rules-
a suit which will go to trial only on questions as to which there is
an honest dispute of fact or law.18 In Burton v. Weyerha-user
Timber Co.,19 the court stated that the test to be applied in
determining whether factual issues should be disclosed before
trial was whether the disclosure would best promote the ends of
justice, and that was for the judge to determine. O'Malley v.
Ch]ySler Gorp.20 held that the trial judge, at his discretion, could
issue such orders as would hasten and simplify the cause before
trial. In Buffington, it is safe to assume that the reports sought
to be withheld were to be entered as evidence and that the plain-
tiffs' reason for opposing an exchange was to preserve the element
of surprise by denying to the defendant any knowledge as to
the extent of the injuries until the trial. One major purpose of
the pre-trial order, however, is to eliminate the element of sur-
prise.21 It is the duty of a judge to take appropriate steps to
fully implement the end sought by the Federal Rules-the con-
version of a lawsuit from a game of manuever and surprise into
a rational, orderly search for the truth.2 2
WA~wE S. TrmmmnAw
17. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
18. Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure, A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D.
417 (1954).
19. 1 F.R.D. 571 (D. Ore. 1941).
20. 160 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1947).
21. Walker v. West Coast Fast Freight, Inc., 233 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1956).
22. Brennan, The Coitithig Education of The Judiciary in Improved Pro-
cedures, 28 F.R.D. 42 (1960).
[Vol. 17
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FEDERAL CFTL PROCEDURE- Mandamus Proceeding-
Judge's active participation in mandamus proceeding requires
his disqualification in subsequent proceedings; therefore reme-
dial mandamus procedure established where review of judicial
act is sought-Rapp v. Van Dusen (3d Cir. 1965).
The death and injury of Pennsylvania residents in a Massa-
chusetts airplane crash presented the increasingly familiar prob-
lem of the applicable rule of damages,1 and on motion of de-
fendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a) ,2 Judge Van
Dusen ordered all actions pending in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania transferred to the District of Massachusetts. The
plaintiffs petitioned for mandamus reviewing the order of trans-
fer and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
judge did not have the power to transfer the actions.4 After
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded the cause to the district court for a re-
consideration of the transfer order.6 On remand, plaintiffs'
motion that Judge Van Dusen disqualify himself under 28
U.S.C. section 4557 from sitting in any further proceedings in
the pending actions was denied. The plaintiffs then filed a
petition for issuance of mandamus naming the judge as sole re-
spondent. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, held,
voluntary disqualification of the district judge should ensue.8
1. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F2d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 1965). See 12 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1601-04 (1953) and 20 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 320.601-05 (1953), which
are compensatory without limitation on amount of recovery; whereas, MASS.
GEN. LAWS, ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1964), is based on degree of culpability and
fixes a maximum limit of recovery.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958), provides: "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
3. Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
4. Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1963) (the actions were
held not to be such as might have been brought in Massachusetts; therefore
did not meet the transfer requirement).
5. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 372 U.S. 964 (1963).
6. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (the Court held that the
courts below had erred in application of § 1404(a) regarding capacity to sue
in the transferee forum and in the applicable substantive law after transfer).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1958), provides: "Any . . . judge of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any case in which he . . . has been of counsel ...
is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial . . . or other proceeding
therein."
8. The court entered no formal order, but granted leave to the petitioners to
apply to the court for a formal order directing issuance of the writ of man-
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Where the purpose of mandamus is to secure what is in effect
an interlocutory review of the intrinsic merits of a judicial act,
the procedure should not require that the judge be made an
active party litigant, and where he has actively participated,
disqualification from subsequent proceeding is proper. Rapp v.
Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965). (5-to-3). 9
The plaintiffs maintained that the actions of Judge Van
Dusen placed him in an "of counsel" relationship with the defend-
ants. Because these actions were precipitated in response to pro-
cedural orders from the court of appeals, 10 that court in the
instant case entered into no direct consideration of section 455;
but rather established a remedial procedure for future mandamus
proceedings and made its beneficial effects immediately appli-
cable.
The traditional mandamus proceeding in the federal courts
from which the Third Circuit derived its new procedure de-
veloped under the umbrella of the All Writs Act." This gen-
eral statutory base authorizes the issuance by the courts of "all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective juris-
dictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
While this language could hardly be interpreted as highly re-
strictive, and variances have occurred in the issuance of writs
under it, the courts have been reasonably uniform in requiring
the presence of certain classic requirements commensurate with
the issuance of mandamus' 2
Under the statute the traditional use of the extraordinary
writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction has been to confine an in-
ferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or
to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.'
3
The supervisory control of the district courts by the courts of
appeals has been expressly found to be an instance for the legiti-
9. This article considers the opinion of the Third Circuit on a rehearing of
this cause requested by Judge Van Dusen. By order of the court of appeals,
its opinion on the original hearing was withdrawn. See 33 U.S.L. WE=x 2304
(Dec. 16, 1964); 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1310 (1964).
10. In the prior mandamus proceeding, the judge had been ordered as a res-
pondent to answer the petition filed against his transfer order, and in so doing
was required alternatively to represent himself, hire counsel, or be represented
by attorneys for the prevailing parties on the challenged order in defense of
that order. This represents usual practice in proceeding pursuant to a petition
for mandamus.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
12. Mandamus Proceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Compromise
With Finality, 52 CALIF. L. RaV. 1036, 1037 (1964).
13. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
[Vol. 17
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mate use of mandamus in order to more nearly effectuate proper
judicial administration within the federal court system.14
Mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against judges are
extraordinary remedies; therefore, they should issue only under
extraordinary circumstances.1 The requirement of the tradi-
tional mandamus proceeding that a judge become a litigant to
the cause pending before him makes it necessary that only in the
unique situation in which appeal is a totally inadequate remedy
should issuance of one of these writs be effected. The courts are
unwilling to utilize prerogative writs as substitutes for appeal, 16
and where a statutory method of appeal has been prescribed,
mandamus may not be resorted to as a mode of review. 17
Circumstances of a nature sufficiently extraordinary to re-
quire remedy by writ have been variously viewed by the courts
but generally arise out of "discretion" situations. The power to
confer the remedy of mandamus in aid of its supervisory control
and appellate jurisdiction is discretionary with the courts of
appeals' 8 to the extent that it does not conflict with the federal
policy against piecemeal appeals. 19 In applying this discretion-
ary standard, the criterion adopted by the courts of appeals has
been the degree of error by the lower courts. No ground for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus exists where the inferior
court has merely erred within the bounds of discretion in a
matter within its legitimate powers.20
The function of the writs and the power to issue them is not
to be exercised in contravention of the policy against review of
interlocutory orders prior to appeal from a final judgment.21
14. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957).
15. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947).
16. Id. at 260; Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-83
(1953); cf. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958). The court dis-
tinguished Green on the grounds that if the transfer motion were granted, the
only review possible in the Third Circuit would be interlocutory; and because
the claim of disqualification arose from matters resulting from the court's
order, so its review by mandamus would be in the exercise of its supervisory
power and in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
17. Butcher and Sherrerd v. Welsh, 206 F2d 259, 261 (3d Cir. 1953). See,
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1920) (remedy by appeal comes too
late to be adequate) ; Connelly v. United States Dist. Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th
Cir. 1951) (desirability of immediate review where adequacy of remedy by
appeal is questionable).
18. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
19. Id. at 260 (dissenting opinion).
20. Cf. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954), determined that the
court of appeals may protect its potential appellate jurisdiction by issuing
mandamus to review an order of the district court.
21. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943).
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The Interlocutory Appeals Act,22 not mandamus, is the proper
avenue of review on any order involving a controlling question
of law on which an immediate appeal might materially affect
the pending litigation. Under proper circumstances2 3 the courts
of appeals may within their discretion permit an appeal from
such an order, but this procedure is conceived in the Act and is
not a petition for mandamus.
The court in Van Dusen, after a consideration of the develop-
ment of the ordinary mandamus proceeding, determined that
while availability of the traditional mandamus was governed
by circumstances attendant upon each situation, the procedure
required of litigants under it remained the same in all cases.
The court drew a distinction between those cases in which an
attack is made upon the merits of a judicial act and the less
frequent instance of a claim directed against the judge personal-
ly.2 4 In a situation where the purpose of mandamus is to secure
review of the intrinsic merits of a judicial act, the court estab-
lished a new procedure 20 in which the judge, although named as
a respondent, is deemed a nominal party only, and the prevailing
parties in the challenged decision are the real parties respondent
who are required to answer the petition. The judge is served with
a copy of the petition as are the other respondents, but he is
under no duty to answer.20 His original opinion on the ques-
tioned order is appropriately considered to be his answer to
contentions of the petition; he may, however, volunta~ily supple-
ment that opinion by filing a memorandum in the mandamus
proceeding in support or explanation of his challenged action.
The desired objective of refraining from making the judge
an active litigant to an action in which he has no personal in-
terest is to preserve both his actual and apparent disinterest in
proceedings before him. Judge Freedman, speaking for the
court, indicated that this objective could best be reached where
procedure does not require the judge to seek outside counsel or
obtain the services of counsel for the successful parties who con-
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
23. The ruling judge must have stated in his written order that the question
involved was one of a controlling nature.
24. E.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 318 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1963)
(judge required to rule promptly on preliminary injunction); Hall v. West,
335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964) (recalcitrant judge was ordered to proceed pur-
suant to 1954 desegregation order of the Supreme Court).
25. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812-13 (3d Cir. 1965).
26. Where the judge does not file an answer which controverts allegations of
the petition, no presumption of the truth of such allegations arises.
28
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tinue to serve their clients by acting as his representative con-
cerning the challenged order.27 Operating within the framework
of the new mandamus procedure the court of appeals would need
to issue no preliminary order to an inferior court which would
even temporarily align the judge with any party to pending liti-
gation; therefore, the judge's likelihood of becoming a suspect for
disqualification due to court imposed "of counsel" relationships
would be materially reduced.
28
Undoubtedly the court proposed mandamus proceeding would
curtail much of the possibility of judges entering into disqualify-
ing relationships with litigants. It does create, however, a sub-
stantial departure from the traditional mandamus procedure by
employing the extraordinary remedy of the writ without the
necessity for showing a manifest abuse of discretion; consequent-
ly, it could lead to a facile means of avoiding statutory remedy.
To relieve a petitioner from less than the requirement responsibil-
ity demanded by the traditional mandamus proceeding could
lead to blockage in the district courts through unwarranted re-
views of interlocutory orders, thereby impeding prompt adminis-
tration of justice.
2 9
The traditional process of operation under mandamus pro-
ceedings, with its attendant facet of the judge's representation
by counsel for the prevailing party litigant, has been given
Supreme Court approval through decision,30 and the Court has
restricted itself in the use of the extraordinary writs by adop-
tion of a limiting rule."' Similarly, the proposed Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure 2 maintain the mandamus proceeding
in substantially the traditional form, indicating at least a broad
based assent to the validity of the traditional procedure by the
federal judiciary.
In the light of the recently enunciated Supreme Court ap-
proval33 of the long standing practice of the various courts of
appeals, adoption of a distinctly different mandamus procedure
by a divided court in one circuit is at best improvident.
ROBERT F. FULLEm
27. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F2d 806, 813 (3d Cir. 1965).
28. Ibid.
29. Intervenors Petition for Rehearing, 7 (Jan. 27, 1965) (the active
judges of the Third Circuit moved for leave to intervene as respondents with
Judge Van Dusen and petitioned for rehearing of the Dec. 16, 1964 opinion).
30. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
31. Sup. CT. R. 30. See, WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, § 108 (1963 ed.).
32. 34 F.R.D. 263, 294 (March 1964).
33. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 30.
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-Partial Assignment to Defeat Fed-
eral Diversity Jurisdiction-Assignment upheld despite allega-
tion of forgery in previous transaction-Heape v. Sullivan (S.C.
1965).
Plaintiff Heape was a resident of Hampton County, South
Carolina. Plaintiff Howe and the defendant were residents of
Florida. Plaintiff Howe had been joined by an assignment of
a 1/100th interest in the cause of action. She had been joined
by a similar assignment in two previous actions and had once
been named administratrix-each time for the specific purpose
of defeating federal diversity jurisdiction.
Suit was brought in the state court for personal injuries aris-
ing out of an automobile collision in South Carolina. The de-
fendant attempted to remove the action to the federal court,
attacking the assignment as part of a pattern of sham and collu-
sion to deprive Florida defendants of their right of removal
from the court of common pleas at Hampton County. The dis-
trict court held that the state court was the proper forum to
assert fraud and remanded the action.1 The court of common
pleas denied the motion to vacate the assignment and, on appeal,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina, per curiam and without
opinion, held, affirmed. Heape v. Sullivan, 143 S.E.2d 366 (S.C.
1965). (5-to-0).
The collusive avoidance of federal jurisdiction has never been
prohibited by federal statute, and it appears that there is no
strong federal policy against the use of sham tactics to defeat
diversity. The plaintiff is possessed of an almost unlimited li-
cense to defeat a non-citizen defendant's supposed right of re-
moval to a federal forum.2 He may join defendants,3 appoint
personal representatives4 or assign infinitessimal amounts of his
claim,5 regardless of motive, so long as his actions are not fraud-
1. Heape v. Sullivan, 233 F. Supp. 127 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
2. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 31 (1963).
3. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184 (1913).
4. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931); see 45 HARv.
L. REv. 743 (1932) ; 30 MIcH. L. Rv. 1341 (1932) ; 41 YALE L.J. 639 (1932).
"The shaping of the rules of diversity jurisdiction to serve such questionable
motives recalls the days of artful common law pleading." 45 HIAv. L. Rjv.
743, 744 (1932).
5. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43 (1886); Lesham v. Continental Am.
Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Richland Box Mfg. Co. v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 82 F. Supp. 274 (E.D.S.C. 1949) (1/100th interest). Contra,
Lisenmy v. Patz, 130 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (partially on the ground
that personal injury claims not reduced to judgment were not assignable in
South Carolina); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. England, 22 F. Supp. 284
[Vol. 17
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ulant or violative of the law or policy of the state in which his
suit is brought.
The plaintiff may join a fellow citizen as a defendant solely
to prevent removal 6 and despite his having no financial means
to satisfy a judgment.7 However, if, to destroy diversity, he
joins a citizen defendant against whom there is no bona fide
cause of action, it is deemed fraudulent in law and will not
defeat removal.8 Not only must the plaintiff actually intend to
obtain a joint judgment, there must be some plausible ground
for securing one;9 otherwise the federal forum will retain the
action. It is not necessary to prove fraudulent intent on the
part of the plaintiff; upon proof of his known lack of a legiti-
mate claim against the resident defendant, a fraudulent joinder
will be presumed.' 0 Further, while many of the earlier cases in-
dicate that a joinder may be successfully attacked only by show-
ing bad faith or the lack of an honest belief in joint liability,1
there is a recognizable tendancy among the federal courts, per-
haps indicative of a change in judicial policy, to base fraudulent
joinder on the mere absence in fact of a joint cause of action.12
While the federal courts have voided the fraudulent joinder
of resident defendants, they are reluctant, if not lacking in
(W.D. Mo. 1938). Compare Phoenix Mut. Life with Daldy v. Ocean Acc. &
Guarantee Corp., 38 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mo. 1941). See generally WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 31 at 88 nn.27-29 (1963).
6. Again, the motive of the plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right
to remove. If there is a joint liability, he has an absolute right to enforce
it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert the right.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193 (1913) (Mr. Justice
Holmes). There can be no fraudulent joinder unless there can be no recovery
on the cause of action under state law. Parks v. New York Times Co., 308
F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962). But see Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No.
America, 251 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958).
7. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 31 at 88 n.31 (1963).
8. If the plaintiff admits or fails to challenge the defendant's allegation that
the joinder was a sham device to prevent removal, the federal court will not
remand the action. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921).
9. Shane v. Kansas City So. Ry., 121 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Ark. 1954).
On the question of removal we have not to consider more than whether
there was a real intention to get a joint judgment, and whether there was
a colorable ground for it shown as the record stood when the removal
was denied.
Chicago, R.I., & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 194 (1913) (Mr. Justice
Holmes).
10. James v. National Pool Equip. Co., 186 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
11. E.g., Updike v. West, 172 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 908 (1949) ; Adkins v. Blakey, 88 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Mo. 1950) ; Barber
v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 72 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
12. See Dodd v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 82 (10th Cir. 1964);
Killebrew v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 233 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Okla. 1964);
Kemp v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 225 F. Supp. 250 (D. Ore. 1963).
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power, to overturn the appointment of an administrator or nullify
an assignment of the cause of action.'3 The validity of both de-
pend on state law and policy, 14 and no fraud is perpetrated on
the jurisdiction of the federal court by the exercise of a state-
condoned right.1 The federal court will sustain removal where
the allegations of the citizenship of the administrator or as-
signee are fraudulent; 16 otherwise illegality, fraud, collusion or
inexpediency must be asserted in the state forum.17
There is no inherent prejudice in a non-citizen defendant's
submitting to the jurisdiction of a state forum. However, the
need for the assertion of federal diversity jurisdiction may be
greatest when the plaintiff tries hardest to defeat it.
The plaintiff who chooses to sue a non-citizen defendant in
a state court may be motivated by the hope that the out-of-
state defendant will be at a substantial disadvantage in that
court, and the likelihood of such motivation, and of actual
prejudice, increases with the lengths to which the plaintiff
will go to prevent removal to a federal forum.' 8
The American Law Institute has recommended legislation that
will give a federal district court the power and the duty to dis-
regard any assignment made to prevent the invoking of federal
jurisdiction.10 Until such time as this or other remedial legis-
13. Compare Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958)
(joinder of resident defendant) with Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284
U.S. 183 (1931) (appointment of administrator) and Heape v. Sullivan, 233 F.
Supp. 127 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (partial assignment).
14. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Bernblum, 122 Conn. 583, 191 Ati.
542 (1937).
15. See Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 288-90 (1939). "[N]o fraud was
perpetrated upon the jurisdiction of this court when the owner of a chose in
action did what he had a legal right to do." Kerigan v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mo. 1947). "This is not an evasion but an
avoidance." Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 82 F. Supp. 274, 276
(E.D.S.C. 1949).
16. Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 82 F. Supp. 274, 276
(E.D.S.C. 1949) (gratuitous statement).
17. "Under the law as it now stands, resort can only be had to the state
courts for protection against the consequences of such an encroachment on
the rights of a defendant." Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43, 45 (1886) ; accord,
Heape v. Sullivan, 233 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Leshem v. Con-
tinental Am. Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
18. ALI STu OF THE DivisioN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED-
ERAL CouRTs, Commentary to § 1307 at 104 (Official Draft No. 1, 1965).
19. Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of the whole
or any part of any interest in a claim or any other property has been to
enable or to prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction under this
chapter or chapter 158 of this title, jurisdiction of a civil action shall be
determined as if such sale, assignment or other transfer had not occurred.
[Vol. 17
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lation is enacted, the validity of these devices will depend on the
law, policy and concepts of justice and propriety of the state
court.
20
Assignments not contrary to express law, public policy or
good morals are valid,21 and a partial assignment of a tort claim
to defeat federal jurisdiction is contrary to none of these. This
entrenched position of the South Carolina Supreme Court was
recently reaffirmed in Durem-as u. Atleantic Coast Line R.R.22
In the present case, however, the defendant did not challenge
the legal sufficiency of the Doremus condoned assignment; he
asserted actual fraud. He maintained that the plaintiff's at-
torneys had conceived a plan to use Mrs. Howe's name in any
case involving a Florida defendant, that the present assignment
was made pursuant to that plan, and that the entire scheme must
be regarded as one continuing transaction. The defendant alleged
that the first time Mrs. Howe's name was used it was forged to
certain official documents in Hampton County23 and maintained
that this initial forgery tainted the entire transaction. Conse-
quently, he argued, there was actual fraud which voided the
assignment contract.
The district court conceded that the record substantiated the
allegations of forgery and abjured its existence but held that
the state court was the proper forum to assert fraud.24 On re-
The word "transfer" as used in this section includes the appointment of a
trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary, or of any other person to hold or
receive interests of any kind, whether made by private persons or by a
court or any other official body.
ALI STUDY OF JURIsDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED AL COURTS § 1307(b)
(Official Draft No. 1, 1965). This section would apply to the appointment of a
representative for a decedent as well. Commentary to § 1307(b) at 105. See
Field, Proposals on Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L. Rxv. 669, 671-72
(1965).
20. The mere intermeddler, the officious stirrer up of litigation in which he
has no interest save the possibility of a commission or a fee, has been
condemned by courts and legislators since the earliest times.
Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381, -, 161 N.W. 364, 365-66 (1917). This state-
ment, of course, was made in a different context.
21. 6 Am. JuR. 2d Assignments § 3 (1963); see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 151(b), 547(1); 3 WILLISTo N, CONTRACTS § 417 (3d ed. 1960). And if the
assignment is otherwise valid, the motive which prompted the assignor to make
the transfer is immaterial. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 4 (1963).
22. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963). Doreinus reaffirmed the court's
earlier position in Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 216 S.C. 20,
56 S.E.2d 585 (1949) where an assignee of a 1/100th interest in the suit was
held to be a real party in interest. See BouLwA.x, GUmE TO REMOVAL AND ITS
PREVENTION 22-26 (1948).
23. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-4, Heape v. Sullivan, 143 S.E.2d 366 (S.C.
1965). See Record, pp. 13-57, Heape v. Sullivan, supra.
24. Heape v. Sullivan, 233 F. Supp. 127, 128 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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mand, the court of common pleas held that the defendant's argu-
ments were decided adversely to him in the federal district
court, and that, in any event, it was controlled by Doremus. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina, per curiam and without
opinion, affirmed. Nowhere in the report of the case is any
mention made of the alleged forgery.
25
In an earlier South Carolina case it was said that:
If the object [of an assignment] be to obtain an unconscien-
tious advantage over the party to be brought to the reckon-
ing, the Court will not lend itself to the enforcement of the
inequitable arrangement. 26
In its overzealousness to preserve its own jurisdiction, our court
has made a significant retreat from this admirable position. In
Doremus it condoned sham; in Heape v. Sullivan, per curiam
and without opinion, it countenanced fraud.
J. KrN~mNA FEw
25. The order of the court of common pleas adopted by the court did note
the defendant's contention that there was "something wrong" with an earlier
transaction.
26. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 4 Strob. Eq. 207, 216 (S.C. 1850).
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INSURANCE--Safety Responsibility Act-Insurer held not re-
quired to defend an in rem proceeding against certified insured's
automobile--Williams nv. Pennsylvania Nat'l Hut. Gas. Go. (S.C.
1965).
The defendant insurer issued a certified automobile liability
policy covering the plaintiff's car. While the policy was in
effect, the car was stolen and involved in an accident with a
third party. Subsequently, it was attached by the injured party
and the insurer was notified. The insurer declined to defend
the in rem action brought against the car, and the plaintiff
through his own attorneys entered into a settlement agreement
and obtained the release of the car from attachment prior to
judgment. The plaintiff then sued the insurer for damages
alleging that the Safety Responsibility Act required the insurer
to defend the previous action and that requirements of that act
must be read into and become a part of his policy.1
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. On ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, affirmed.
The lien against the plaintiff's automobile is not covered under
the act since the act relates to liability imposed by law and
there was no personal liability in the in rem action against the
car. Williams 'v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 143 S.E.
2d 797 (S.C. 1965). (3-to-2).
The purpose of the Safety Responsibility Act, enacted in 1952,
is to protect the public from irresponsible drivers.2 Its provisions
are essentially the same as the Virginia statutes which served
as the prototype of this legislation.3 In defining the minimal
1. In Williams' liability policy the defendant insurance company agreed "to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay . . .; and the company shall defend any suit alleging such
bodily injury or property damage. . . ." Williams v. Pennsylvania Nat1 Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 143 S.E2d 797 (S.C. 1965).
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance or of property
damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued or delivered in
this State ... unless it contains a provision insuring the persons defined
as insured against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicles ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1964).
This code provision is incorporated into the insurance contract. Pulliam v.
Doe, 142 S.E2d 861 (S.C. 1965).
2. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964). The
requirement of motorists with hazardous driving records to have a liability
policy certified as proof of their financial responsibility is to protect the public
from such insureds' negligence. Section 46-750.32 sets minimal liability stand-
ards for the certified insured.
3. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-504(c) (1950) wuith S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 46-750.32 (Supp. 1964).
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liability requirements of a certified insured, section 46-750.32 of
the Safety Responsibility Act requires that such a liability policy
insure "against loss from liability imposed by law."4 There is
no provision in the act, however, which either expressly or by
implication requires that an auto liability policy must insure
against any and all liability regardless of the circumstances.5
While there is a broad public policy underlying the enactment
of this statute, the court will not "read into the insurance con-
tract, under the guise of public policy, provisions which are not
required by law and which the parties thereto failed to include."6
The attachment provision of the South Carolina Code7 was
originally enacted in 1912, forty years prior to the enactment of
the Safety Responsibility Act, but the purpose is the same and
they are to be construed in pari materia. 8 Under the attachment
provision an injured party may maintain an in rem action against
the automobile alone without making the owner a party. The
owner's remedy is to intervene and set up his rights to the at-
tached car.9 In the in rem proceeding, the automobile is liable
and not the owner,10 so that judgment against an attached auto-
mobile does not impose any personal liability upon the owner.
The owner, however, suffers a real loss in the form of giving up
his automobile if he does not pay damages or settle with the
attaching party.
Since the attachment provision of the South Carolina Code im-
poses no personal liability, the South Carolina Supreme Court in
"illiams v. Pennsylvania Nat'Z M t. Cas. Ins. Go."1 held that
damages paid by the owner are not within the required coverage
of the Safety Responsibility Act.
The wording of section 46-750.32, however, seems to indicate
that the certified insured is entitled to any loss from liability
imposed by law arising out of the ownership of use of the auto-
mobile. The court's holding in Williams, by restricting the
section to losses arising from personal liability, appears to contra-
4. S.C. CoD ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1964).
5. Stanley v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 533, 121 S.E2d 10 (1961).
6. Barkley v. International Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38, 86 S.E.2d 602 (1955).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-551 (1962).
8. Williams v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 143 S.E2d 797 (S.C.
1965) (dissenting opinion).
9. Tolbert v. Buick Car, 142 S.C. 362, 140 S.E. 693 (1927). Accord, Corley
v. One 1950 International Truck, 109 F. Supp. 730 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
10. Merchants and Planters Bank v. Brigman, 106 S.C. 362, 91 S.E. 332
(1917).
11. 143 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1965).
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dict well-established rules of statutory construction. 12 In light
of the history of section 46-750.32, it also appears doubtful that
the legislature intended to restrict the provision to personal lia-
bility.'3 It is interesting to note that an earlier attempt of the
court to restrict a provision of the Safety Responsibility Act re-
sulted in legislative action extending the coverage of the act.
14
RuDoLPH C. BAR~ss, Jit.
12. Where the terms of statutes are positive and unambiguous, exceptions
not made by the legislature cannot be read into the act by implication. Vernon
v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964). Accord,
Hatchett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964);
Creech v. South Caroilna Pub. Serv. Authority, 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645
(1942).
13. In the first Safety Responsibility Act, passed in South Carolina in 1952, the
legislature distinguished between coverage under a certified owners' policy and a
certified operator's policy. An operator's policy required insurance "against
loss from liability imposed upon hint by law" while an owner's policy re-
quired insurance "against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle." S.C.
AcTs & J. REs. 1952, p. 723. In the present act there is no such distinction
between an operator's and an owner's policy, and since the present wording
is essentially that of the earlier provision regarding an owner's policy, it seems
that the legislature intended to eliminate the personal liability restriction. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1964). When the legislature adopts an amend-
ment to a statute, there is presumed to be some change in the law. Vernon v.
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964).
14. In Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964),
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that no provision of the Uninsured
Motorist Act (part of the Safety Responsibility Act) required an insurance
carrier to pay punitive damages to its insured. The Laird case was overruled
by S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(4) (Supp. 1964), which expressly provides
for payment of actual and punitive damages to the insured.
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INSURANCE-Uninsured Motorist Act-Double coverage liabil-
ity imposed on insurance company notwithstanding "other in-
surance" clause-Bryant v. State Farm Hut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Va.
1965).
Following an automobile accident, the plaintiff recovered
judgment against an uninsured motorist. He received maximum
coverage from the uninsured motorist provisions of his father's
insurance policy which covered anyone driving the vehicle in-
volved in the accident. He then initiated this action to require
the defendant to pay the maximum limit of liability of his own
insurance. The defendant denied this double coverage because
of an "other insurance" clause contained in the plaintiff's person-
al policy. The trial court denied recovery. On appeal to the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, held, reversed. Double
coverage liability is possible under the present Virginia statute
notwithstanding "other insurance" clauses.' Bryant v. State
F arm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
(6-to-0).
Uninsured motorist provisions are required by the Virginia
law to provide each insured motorist with protection if he is
involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist. This type
statute has been adopted by an increasing number of states. The
problem of double coverage arises when the injured party is
covered by two policies.
In 1963 the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
construed the Virginia law in Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells.2
The injured party, Mrs. Wells, was covered by her own insurance
policy and that of her host, both of which contained uninsured
motorist provisions. Her policy contained a standard "other
insurance" clause purporting to apply her insurance only as
excess insurance (within the limits of liability of her policy)
to any similar provisions covering her at the time an accident
occurred." The court found that both uninsured motorist pro-
visions applied the same limit of liability, consequently her in-
1. The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Act is based on the Virginia act.
Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964). Compare
VA. CODE ANN. ch. 8, § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1964), with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-
750.31 to -750.39 (Supp. 1964).
2. 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963).
3. 6. Other Insurance. With respect to bodily injury to an insured while
occupying an authomobile not owned by the named insured under this
endorsement, the insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance
over any other similar insurance available to such occupant, and this
insurance shall then apply only in; the amount by which the applicable
[Vol. 17
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surance was "explicitly excluded" by the "other insurance" con-
dition.4 The provision of the Virginia statute which said that
no section should limit the liability of the insurance company
was held to be too inexplicit to change the decision.
Notwithstanding Wells, the Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in a similar situation imposed double coverage liability
in Bryant.6 The court interpreted the uninsured motorist pro-
visions of the Virginia Code to allow the insured to collect all
sums to which he is legally entitled as damages.7 It was held
that the "other insurance " clause of the plaintiff's policy was
of no effect because it was an attempt to limit the statute. The
court recognized Wells but expressed disagreement -with its
holding.
The majority of jurisdictions agree with Wells.8 Two cases
have reached the same result as FYells because of an express pro-
vision in the statutory law which allows "other insurance"
clauses.9 Oregon alone has followed the Bryant rationale.10
In 1962 the South Carolina Supreme Court handled an anal-
ogous problem concerning a property damage provision of a
prior Uninsured Motorist Act. In Vernon v. Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co.,1 the court held that because an exclusion of the first
200 dollars for property loss or damage was expressed, any other
exclusion (e.g., "other insurance" exclusion) had to be stated in
the statute or it would not be effective as a policy limitation. If
the "other insurance" clause had been effective in this case, it
limit of liability of this endorsement exceeds the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of all such other insurance. (Emphasis added.)
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770, 772 (4th Cir. 1963). This clause
contains wording which is very similar to most "other insurance" clauses and
can be taken as an example of the clauses referred to hereinafter.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 774.
6. Bryant v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817
(1965).
7. (b) Nor shall any such policy or contract relating to ownership, main-
tenance or use of a motor vehicle be so issued or delivered unless it con-
tains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all
sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle...
VA. CODE ANN. ch. 8, § 38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1964).
8. Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.
1965) ; Burcham v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963);
Globe Indem. Co. v. Baker, 22 App. Div. 2d 658, 253 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1964).
9. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(c) (2) (Supp. 1964). This section was con-
strued by Kirby v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1965) and Grunfeld
v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1965).
10. Smith v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 400 P,2d 512 (Ore. 1965).
11. 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E2d 841 (1962).
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would have been a limitation upon the statute which the court
would not allow.
There is an express exception for workmen's compensation in
the life and accident insurance area of the present South Caro-
lina law.12 According to the rationale of Vernon, that expres-
sion of one exception is indicative of an intent to exclude all
others; an express statutory exception allowing "other insurance"
clauses would be required to give effect to an "other insurance"
clause contained in the policy.
Since Vernon the membership of the court has not changed.
The legislature, however, has passed an express exclusion allow-
ing "other insurance" clauses in the property damage area but
has not done so in the accident and life insurance area.' There-
fore, in all probability South Carolina would adopt the Bryant
view and adopt double coverage, rendering the "other insurance"
clauses presently relied upon by insurance companies of the state
in this type situation ineffective.
WmLTAm S. DAViES, JR.
12. S.C. CODE ANx. § 46-750.39 (Supp. 1964).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.38 (Supp. 1964).
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PROPERTY-Rights of Access-Abutting property owner on
interstate system must be compensated for denial of access. South
Carolina Highway Dep't '. Allison (S.C. 1965).
The defendant owned a forty-acre tract of land which fronted
on a U.S. Highway. Condemnation proceedings were instituted
in connection with the acquisition of a right of way for a con-
trolled-access facility, one lane of which was to be constructed
on top of the old road. Prior to the taking the landowner had
access to the road along the entire extremity of his property.
After the taking, he will have identical access to a frontage road
being constructed in conjunction with the controlled-access high-
way. By traveling seven-tenths of a mile south of his property
on this frontage road, he can enter the new highway as well as
the general highway system. In the condemnation action, the
defendant alleged that he should be compensated for his loss of
access. The lower court held in favor of the defendant. On ap-
peal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, held, affirmed. It
is well settled in South Carolina that a landowner has a right
of access to an adjacent street and that the legislature intended
to allow compensation for the loss of such right. South Carolina
Highway Dep't v. Allison, 143 S.E.2d 800 (S.C. 1965). (5-to-0).
Originally, roads were primarily built for the abutting land-
owner's use and the development of his land. The landowner
generally donated the lands, material, and money or labor for
the roads. From this stems the right of access.'
Today, under the interstate highway system, the primary pur-
pose of roadways is to provide for the general welfare. The aim
is to decrease the enormous death and injury rate and to provide
more efficient and economical travel for the general public.
Therefore, roads are now becoming more traffic-service than
land-service.2 There appears to be a gradual changing of the
"right of access". The older cases generally speak of access from
any point adjacent to the land on the highway,3 where the more
1. Gibbs, Control of Highway Access-Its Prospects and Problems, 12
S.C.L.Q. 377 (1960).
2. Ibid. See Covey, Highway Protection Through Control of Access and
Roadside Development, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 567.
3. E.g., Berridge v. Ward, 2 F.&F. 208, 175 Eng. Rep. 1026 (N.P. 1860).
This, apparently, is the basic underlying reason for the South Carolina court's
decision in Allison. It appears that the court has chosen the old time definition
of right of access which says that the property owner has a right of access at
every point at which the property abuts the street.
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modern cases' and recently adopted statutes5 restrict the right
to reasonable access. This reflects the idea of controlled-access
highways being traffic-service.6
Normally, when controlled-access highways are built over
existing roads, frontage roads are provided the adjacent land
owners. The landowner is thus given a right of ingress and egress
from his property, but, of course, his right of access to the high-
way itself is impaired.
The courts are divided as to whether a right to compensation
exists for this loss of access.7 The courts which do not allow
compensation have generally said that the denial of or injury to
the right of access is within the state's police power and necessary
for the public welfare. The substitution of a frontage road pro-
vides a reasonable access, and diminution in the property value
is damnum absgue injurina. This regulation is as necessary as
stop signs and one-way streets.
8
Many of these states have statutes providing for the establish-
ment of controlled-access facilities, but more weight is apparent-
ly given to the purpose of the preamble of these acts9 than to
the wording of the statute. North Carolina, for instance, has a
statute saying that "when an existing street or highway shall be
designated as and included within a controlled-access facility
the owner of the land abutting such street or highway shall be
entitled to compensation for the taking of or injury to their
easements of access."' 01 The North Carolina court in Moses 'v.
,State Highway Comm'n denied recovery on the ground that
the landowner still has a complete right of access to the system
of public roads, and that any inconvenience is merely non-coin-
4. Eg., State Highway Dep't v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W2d 755
(1957) ; Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W2d 76 (1957).
5. E.g., Nmx. REv. STAT. § 39-1328 (Supp. 1957).
6. Covey, Highway Protection Through Control of Access and Roadside
Development, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 567, 572.
7. Compare Blount County v. McPherson, 269 Ala. 133, 105 So. 2d 117
(1958) and Arizona v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960) and Florida
State Turnpike Auth. v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959) with Muse v.
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 233 Miss. 694, 103 So. 2d 839 (1958) and
Northern Lights Shopping Center, Inc. v. New York, 20 App. Div. 2d 415, 247
N.Y.S.2d 333 (1964).
8. See Moses v. State Highway Comm'n, 261 N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d 664
(1964) ; Hillerege v. City of Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957).
9. S.C. AcTs & J. RES. 1956, p. 621. The preamble essentially says that the
act is for the preservation of the peace, health, and safety of the general
public and the promotion of the general welfare.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-89.53 (1964).
11. 261 N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d 664 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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pensable circuity of travel. Any loss of value in the property
being placed on the frontage road was held to be merely non-
compensable diversion of traffic. The damage to the landowner
is the same as that to the general public and only different in
degree.1
2
Those states allowing compensation hold that any obstruction
injuring or depriving a right of access constitutes a "taking" of
property for which the owner must be compensated.' 3
Three states have almost identical statutes to South Carolina. 4
Each of these statutes includes "rights of access" among those
rights which the highway department is authorized to acquire.
The courts of these states have allowed recovery by the abutting
landowners saying that an abutting landowner has a private right
of access which cannot be taken or interferred with without just
compensation, and if compensation was not intended, "rights of
access" would not be mentioned in the statute.15 However, in
Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith,1 the court said that
the Iowa statute, which also closely resembles South Carolina's,
had no bearing on the problem. It conferred no rights on the
landowners which they would not have had in its absence, and
they were not in a more favorable position because of it.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Allison rejected the doc-
trine of Smith and held that this state's statute requires that
compensation be made for the loss of access. The court qualified
this, however, by holding that the value of the service road
must be considered in mitigation of damages.
The rationale of the court has been strongly criticized. 17 It
is said that by holding the right of access of the landowner to be
12. Covey, supra note 6 at 580.
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 45 S.E2d 603 (1947).
14. 13A FLA. STAT. ANN. § 338.04 (1957); ALA. CODE § 23-145 (1958);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-2205 (Supp. 1962). S.C. CoDE ANN. § 33-217 (1962)
provides:
The Department may acquire such lands and property, including rights
of access, as may be needed for controlled-access facilities, by gift, devise,
purchase or condemnation, in the same manner as now or hereafter au-
thorized by law for acquiring property rights in connection with other
state highways. Along new highway locations abutting property owners
shall not 'be entitled, as a matter of rights, to access to such new lo-
cations, and any denial of such rights of access shall not be deemed
grounds for special damages. (Emphasis added.)
15. Blount County v. McPherson, 269 Ala. 133, 105 So. 2d 117 (1958); Ari-
zona v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960) ; Florida State Turnpike
Auth. v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959) reversing on rehearing 107 So.
2d 51 (Fla. 1958).
16. 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957).
17. 3 STAN. L. RPv. 298, 300 (1951).
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impaired when he is provided with a service road, the court has
awarded compensation for circuity of travel. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has long held that circuity of travel is non-
compensable I8 and that a landowner has no rights to traffic.19
By its decision, South Carolina appears to have adopted a
view opposed to the concept of highways as traffic-service rather
than land-service. The decision does appear, however, to be an
equitable balancing of the various interests. The Allison case
may force the highway department to build completely new
controlled-access highways instead of designating parts of exist-
ing ones as such since the abutting landowners would have no
right of access to the new locations.20 But this, of course, in-
volves the balancing of the costs of acquiring the rights against
the cost of building on entirely new locations.
PEDFN B. McLEoD
18. See Cherry v. City of Rock Hill, 48 S.C. 553, 26 S.E. 798 (1897).
19. See Wilson v. Greenville County, 110 S.C. 321, 96 S.E. 301 (1918).
However, if a court defines a right of access as a given location where the
landowner's property abuts the highway, the arguments of circuity of travel
and diversion of traffic have no relevance since the injury compensated for is
the loss of a right of access in that particular location.
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-217 (1962).
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TAXATION-Jurisdiction of the South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion-Commission's jurisdiction to refund erroneously paid taxes
restricted to cases involving an erroneous valuation of property--
Owings Mills, Inc. v. Brady (S.C. 1965).
In an earlier case the Glens Falls Insurance Company over-
paid certain business taxes, but not under protest, to the city of
Columbia. The tax commissioner directed the city to refund the
overpayment and the court of common pleas affirmed. On
appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the tax commission's authority to refund taxes not paid
under protest extends only to property taxes.' In the present
case, appellants paid a property tax without protest and later
demanded refund on the grounds that the property was tax
exempt. The tax commission ordered a refund and the court
of common pleas affirmed. On appeal to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, held, reversed. Unless the valuation placed up-
on the property is in question, the commission has no juris-
diction. Owings Mills, Inc. v. Brady, 143 S.E.2d 717 (S.C. 1965).
A taxpayer has two statutory methods of obtaining a refund
of erroneously paid municipal taxes. He may pay these taxes
under protest 2 or, failing to pay under protest, he may, within
the statutory period, petition the tax commission for a refund."
If he pays under protest, the commission may direct the refund
of either business license taxes or property taxes. If he does
not pay under protest, however, the commission may still direct
the refund of erroneously assessed property taxes, but it has no
authority to refund business taxes. This was the apparent hold-
ing of City of Columbia v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.4
Glens Falls' restriction of the commission's refunding author-
ity to property taxes was based on four considerations: (1) the
purpose of the commission; (2) construction of the statutory
word "assessment"; (3) legislative intent; and (4) expediency.
1. The stated purpose of the commission was to effectuate
"the equitable assessment of property for taxation."5 The ex-
1. We therefore hold that the remedy provided by Sections 65-2681 and 65-
2682 applies only to assessments and refund of property taxes and does
not afford a remedy for the recovery of the business license taxes here
involved which, admittedly, are not property taxes.
City of Columbia v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 119, 121, 139 S.E.2d 529,
532 (1965).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2661 (1962).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2681 to -684 (1962).
4. 245 S.C. 719, 139 S.E.2d 529 (1965).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-51 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
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pressed application only to property taxes would imply inappli-
cation to other taxes including license taxes.
2. The statute provides for the refund of erroneously "assess-
ed" taxes by the commission. The word "assessment" in its more
restricted sense has the connotation of an evaluation of property.
3. No legislative policy was found to vest the commission
with authority to refund all taxes. Further, the stated authority
for refunding all taxes paid to the commission, including license
fees, in a companion statute, 6 and the absence of any express
authority in the provision in question, indicated a legislative
intent to exclude such authority in the latter statute.
4. The granting of authority to refund unprotested license
fees at any time during the statutory period after payment
would leave the status of municipally collected taxes in doubt
and produce instability in the taxing system.
In holding that the statutory word "assessment" referred only
to property, the court admitted that its interpretation was nar-
row. It did, however, have ample authority for this narrow
construction. Earlier South Carolina cases have interpreted
assessment to mean value placed on property for taxation pur-
poses.7 Similarly, "assessment" has been narrowly construed
elsewhere as the estimated value placed on a citizen's property8
and as a charge levied on property.9
Language in other cases, however, has given assessment a less
restricted meaning. 10 "An assessment, strictly spealdng, is an
official estimate of the sums which are to constitute the basis
of an apportionment of a tax between the individual subjects
of taxation within the district.""
The apparent property-non-property distinction in Glens
F als was elucidated in Owings to further reduce the tax corn-
6. S.C. CODE ANx. § 65-2684 (1962).
7. State ex rel. Morse v. Cornwell, 40 S.C. 26, 29, 18 S.E. 184, 186 (1893);
State cx rel. Vandiver v. Tolley, 37 S.C. 551, 554, 16 S.E. 195, 196 (1892).
8. American Province v. Douglas County, 147 Neb. 485, 23 N.W.2d 714
(1946) ; Grubb v. Johnson Oil Ref. Co., 198 Okla. 433, 179 P.2d 688 (1947).
9. Roland v. Southern Title & Trust Co., 65 Cal. App. 2d 272, 150 P.2d
494 (Cal. App. 1944). Cf. Cirassella v. Village of South Orange, 57 N.J. Super.
522, 155 A.2d 134 (App. Div. 1959).
10. See Pipola v. Chicco, 169 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); V. Mueller &
Co. v. United States, 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 249, 115 F.2d 354 (1940);
Abrams v. City & County of San Francisco, 48 Cal. App. 2d 1, 119 P.2d 197
(Cal. App. 1941).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 5 [1964], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss5/10
RECENT DECISIONS
mission's jurisdiction. Owings held that the commission had
jurisdiction to refund only those property taxes that had been
paid under an "erroneous, improper or illegal assessment," "as-
sessment" meaning the value placed on the property for taxation
purposes. If, therefore, the tax is challenged on other grounds
than an improper valuation of the taxable property-as in the
present case where the property itself was assertedly tax exempt
-the commission is without authority to declare a refund. As-
suming Glens Falls, the Owings holding appears inescapable.
In both cases, the court was obviously guided by the desire
to limit the jurisdiction of the commission. It now appears,
however, that municipal corporations have an unfair advantage.
As is suggested by the court,12 the legislature should take note
of this situation and give the taxpayer the same opportunity to
obtain refunds of municipal license taxes as he has with prop-
erty and state taxes.
EARLE G. PimvosT
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